

















































Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği | Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 
Söğütözü Cad. No. 43, TOBB-ETÜ Binası, Oda No. 364, 06560 Söğütözü | ANKARA 
Phone: (312) 2924108 | Fax: (312) 2924325 | Web: www.uidergisi.com | E- Mail: bilgi@uidergisi.com 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkish 





Dr., Bilkent University, Department of International 
Relations 
 
To cite this article: Ekinci, Didem, “The War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Turkish Parliamentary Debates (1992-
1995): A Constructivist Approach”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 
Volume 6, No 22 (Summer 2009), p. 37-60. 
Copyright @ International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT). All rights reserved. No 
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated, in any form, or 
by any means, without prior written permission from UİK, to whom all requests to reproduce 
copyright material should be directed, in writing. References for academic and media 
coverages are boyond this rule. 
Statements and opinions expressed in Uluslararası İlişkiler are the responsibility of the authors 
alone unless otherwise stated and do not imply the endorsement by the other authors, the 
Editors and the Editorial Board as well as the International Relations Council of Turkey.  
 
 
ULUSLARARASIiLiŞKiLER, Cilt 6, Sayı 22, Yaz 2009, s. 37 - 60 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkish 




While fully engaged in efforts of suppressing the armed violence in the former 
Yugoslavia at the turn of the century, Ankara could foresee the coming events, 
repeatedly called for immediate multilateral action, and argued adamantly about who 
the aggressor and victim were as opposed to the relevant ambiguity in the West. 
Central to policy formulations at political parties were Turkey’s Balkan 
heritage/identity, stance against aggression, and the significance of Balkan routes for 
Turkey. Drawing upon detailed empirical data obtained from parliamentary 
discussions in three frames, this study examines under which circumstances the 
Turkish ‘state’, its identity, interests and intersubjectivities were at work shaping 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Bosnia. Finally, it is emphasized that Ankara’s 
foreign policy towards the war was competent despite coalition governments 
composed of different political mainstreams.  
Keywords: Turkey, Parliament, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, UN. 
Bosna-Hersek Savaşı ve Türk Parlamento 
Görüşmeleri (1992-1995): İnşacı Bir Yaklaşım 
ÖZET 
Ankara, bu yüzyılın sonuna doŞru eski Yugoslavya’daki silahlı şiddet olaylarının 
bastırılmasına yönelik çabalara bütünüyle dâhil olmuşken, meydana gelebilecek 
olayları önceden görebilmiş, sürekli olarak derhal çok taraflı müdahale çaŞrısında 
bulunmuş ve Batı’daki konuya ilişkin müphem durumun aksine saldırgan ve maŞdur 
ayrımına dair kararlı bir tutum sergilemiştir. Siyasi partilerin politikalarının 
temelinde Türkiye’nin Balkan mirası/kimliŞi, saldırganlıŞa karşı duruşu ve Balkan 
geçiş yollarının Türkiye için önemi bulunmaktaydı. Bu çalışma, üç zaman diliminde 
ele alınan meclis tartışmalarından elde edilen ayrıntılı ampirik verilerden yola 
çıkarak, inşacı çerçevede Türk ‘devleti’nin, kimliŞinin, çıkarlarının ve karşılıklı 
öznelliklerinin hangi koşullarda işlediŞini incelemektedir. Son olarak, Ankara’nın 
savaşa ilişkin dış politikasının, farklı siyasi geleneklerden gelen partilerin 
oluşturduŞu koalisyon hükümetleri bulunmasına raŞmen iyi hazırlanmış olduŞu 
belirtilmektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Parlamento, Bosna-Hersek, Sırbistan, BM. 
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This Examination of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina during 
the war and its aftermath aims at analyzing the conditions under which the 
debates generated by incumbent governments and opposition parties in the 
Turkish Parliament and foreign policies of incumbent coalition governments 
influence the foreign policy making process. During the three-year war, 
opposition parties in the parliament contested Turkey’s “inaction” during the 
war and even went to great lengths by advocating unilateral intervention in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina out of religious sentiment as well as nationalistic hubris. 
However, the decision-makers did not deviate from the foreign policy line of 
multilateral intervention, active diplomacy, and public support to Bosnia-
Herzegovina.1 Ankara was also adamant about who the aggressor and victim 
were as opposed to the initial ambiguity in the West. Although some influential 
political actors in Turkey viewed the conflict as such, the decision-makers never 
substituted the notion of Christian-Muslim conflict for mass murder.  
By and large, Turkey’s Bosnian policy during the war rested on three pillars 
in the larger picture: its identity as to the Balkan heritage, stance against 
aggression as the ultimate objective, and to keep the Balkan land/air routes open 
as they were the major access routes to Europe in terms of trade as the main 
interest. Furthermore, Turkey tried not to sever its diplomatic relations with 
Serbia throughout the whole ordeal although both parties had their differences. 
Within a constructivist perspective, this study examines how the interplay 
between the embedded identity of the state as to the Balkan heritage, its long-
term national interests and immediate foreign policy goals constructed the 
relevant policies of the political parties in the parliament throughout the war. 
The study is organized to unfold in five parts, the first of which provides the 
                                                            
1  From the beginning of the war in April 1992, until the end of it in November 1995, four 
governments served in Turkey for rather short terms. From 20 November 1991 to 25 June 
1993, the 7th Demirel government (49th government), which was a coalition of True Path 
Party (TPP, DoŞru Yol Partisi, center-right) and Social Democratic People’s Party (SDPP, 
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, center-left), held power. The second government was also a 
coalition of these parties which held power between 25 June 1993 and 5 October 1995, 
known as the 1st Çiller government (50th government). After SDPP joined Republican 
People’s Party (RPP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, center-left) on 18 February 1995, TPP – 
RPP coalition began. The third was the TPP government, known as the 2nd Çiller 
government, which held power between 5 October 1995 and 30 October 1995 (51st 
government). Holding power between 30 October 1995 and 6 March 1996, the successor 
of this government was the 3rd Çiller government, which was a coalition of TPP and RPP 
(52nd government). The opposition parties in the same period were Motherland Party (MP, 
Anavatan Partisi, center-right), RPP, Democratic Left Party (DLP, Demokratik Sol Parti, 
center-left), Nationalist Movement Party (NMP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, center-right) 
and Welfare Party (WP, Refah Partisi, pro-Islamic). Throughout the article, the English 
abbreviations of the parties shall be used.  
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basic premises of constructivism as the theoretical framework to be employed. 
The second part, which provides the empirical data of the study, constitutes the 
first section of parliamentary debates between 1991 and 1992, to be followed by 
third and fourth parts exploring relevant discussions between 1993 and 1994; 
and in 1995, respectively. The fifth part is the presentation of a way to construe 
parliamentary debates on the war in a constructivist framework. It concludes 
that viewed through the constructivist framework, even in the most challenging 
of times, Ankara’s foreign policy making towards the war was consistent and 
productive, compared to its western counterparts.  
Theoretical Framework: Social Constructivism 
Labelling constructivism as a structural theory of the international system, 
Alexander Wendt lists its basic tenets as follows:  
(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; 
(2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than 
material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part 
constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the 
system by human nature or domestic politics.2  
With the first and second premises, constructivism subscribes to the 
argument that states are the principal actors and the structures of the 
international system are important. And in the third premise, it points to 
identities and interests as constructed by the social as the well as material world. 
That being said, the constructivist view of the policy formulations of the Turkish 
state towards the war in Bosnia fits in with the argument that the policy 
considerations of the state involved standing against aggression and keeping 
Balkan routes open within its own material capacities and abilities, which were 
shaped not in a purely rationally defined manner, but also around 
intersubjectivities.  
Regarding the third proposition, Wendt maintains that “a world in which 
identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded 
practice, by what states think and do, is one which ‘anarchy is what states make 
of it’” 3 In other words, actors view the material world through their own lenses 
and make their own interpretation of it. Constructivism focuses on this lens 
                                                            
2  Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No 2, June 1994, p. 385. See also Birgül Demirtaş–
Coşkun, “Ankara ve Berlin’in Bosna Savaşı’na Yönelik Politikaları: Karşılaştırmalı Bir 
şnceleme”, Uluslararası şlişkiler Dergisi, Vol. 4, No 13, Spring 2007, p. 62–63. 
3  As cited in Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 39-40. 
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which shapes the identity and interests of the state in question. According to 
constructivism, identities can change through interaction and shape interests.4 
As regards the war in Bosnia, the state identity of Turkey embedded in mutual 
social structures and its Balkan heritage were significant in the policy 
formulations of the Parliament throughout the war, which, for instance, led to 
Ankara’s marked distinction between the victim and aggressor right from the 
beginning of the ordeal, unlike the ambiguous, if not aloof, attitude in the West 
which viewed the conflict as a civil war. Furthermore, constructivism offers a 
useful tool to the study of international relations also when exploring the 
concept of responsibility; and in our case, this appraisal is applied to the war in 
Bosnia. Constructivist theories accept as given a reality from which to start an 
investigation and they start from “what they posit this reality to be”.5 More 
specifically, what is important is how to deal with being part of a reality through 
interpretations and our practices. Put differently, whether we feel responsible or 
not shall mostly depend on our interpretation of a reality. The concept of 
responsibility in constructivist theorizing has eventually brought up the question 
of how to respond to others’ needs “without losing oneself or further 
endangering both the other and oneself”.6 Here, constructivism offers a plausible 
explanation to ascertain political parties’ portrayal of the “reality” in Bosnia and 
their search of possibilities for responsible action, including intervention. 
Accordingly, the next sections demonstrate the empirical evidence in 
examining how these parameters were found to be at work in the parliamentary 
discussions shaping Turkey’s policy towards the war in Bosnia, and investigate 
whether they proved to be in force all along the war or whether disruptions 
became possible. 
Prelude to and Initial Phases of War (1990 – 1992) 
In the years preceding the war, Turkey and Yugoslavia had friendly relations 
which were recorded particularly in the economic venue. Shortly before the war 
erupted, State Minister Cemil Çiçek (MP) went Belgrade to attend the 8th 
Meeting of the Turkish – Yugoslavian Economic Cooperation Joint Commission. 
Five months later, Yalım Erez, President of the Turkish Union of Chambers and 
Stock Exchanges (TOBB), stated that joint investments could be launched 
between the two states to sell goods to third parties.7 In October 1990, the 
second Turkish – Yugoslavian Business Conference produced the memorandum 
of understanding signed by Yalım Erez and Milan Pavic, President of the 
                                                            
4  Ibid., p.41–43; and Yücel BozdaŞlıoŞlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity–
Constructivist Approach, New York, Routledge, 2003, p.15-33. 
5  Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, p.254–255. 
6  Ibid., p.258.  
7  “Yalım Erez: Ortak Yatırım Yapalım”, Tercüman, 13 October 1990. 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkish Parliamentary Debates 
41 
Yugoslav Economic Chamber.8 This reason was enough to argue that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the two states continued to preserve their 
economy-wise intersubjective practices and their interests in this domain 
remained unadulterated.  
When separatist tendencies became visible by 1991, Ankara maintained that 
the constituent republics should resolve their disputes through negotiation, on 
several occasions, including during Bosnian President Aliya Izzetbegovic’s visit 
to Ankara on 15 July, Foreign Minister Safa Giray’s (MP) visit to Sarajevo on 30 
August, and a Turkish delegation’s visit to Yugoslavia on 23 October, 
respectively.9 After the irreversible disintegration process set in, Turkey 
recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia in February 
1992. 
In the diplomatic venue, Turkey’s initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
been so prioritized in the first half of the 1990s that the Balkans were viewed as 
“Bosnia and the rest of the Balkans” from the official Turkish perspective.10 
Shortly after supporting the continuation of the status quo in the initial phases of 
war, Turkey changed its position upon increasing Serbian aggression and the 
irreversible wave of disintegration. The new policy was threefold: to bring an end 
to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and preserve its independence; to prevent the 
spillover effect of war in Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Sandjak and Vojvodina; 
and to draw international attention to the crisis through every diplomatic means 
possible.11 
In the face of increasing attacks, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin (SDPP) 
announced that Turkey could send troops to the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) in January 1992 upon request. The European Community 
(EC) recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, which was welcomed by 
Turkey. Thereafter, skirmishes turned into full-scale fighting. Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel stated that Turkey would bring the issue to the agenda in the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in April 1992. Ankara sent a 
diplomatic delegation to Belgrade in April 1992 for a six-day visit to hold 
contacts with the political leaders of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
missions of the EC and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
                                                            
8  “Üçüncü Ülkelere Yatırım Yapalım”, Milliyet, 14 October 1990. 
9  Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia–Herzegovina”, Günay Göksu 
ÖzdoŞan and Kemali Saybaşılı (eds.), Balkans –A Mirror of the New International Order, 
şstanbul, Eren, 1995, p. 299. 
10  Şule Kut, “SoŞuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye’nin Balkan Ülkeleriyle şlişkileri”, şsmail Sosyal (der.), 
ÇaŞdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999, s. 395. 
11  Duygu BazoŞlu Sezer, “Turkish Security in the Shifting Balkans: Reorientation to a 
Regional Focus”, Kosta Tsipis (ed.), Common Security Regimes in the Balkans, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 102.  
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(CSCE). Meanwhile, Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Muhammed Cengic called 
Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister Erdal şnönü (SDPP) to say that despite 
the recent ceasefire, Serb militia could not be controlled and asked for support.12 
Subsequently, Özal contacted George Bush, François Mittérand, King Fahd, 
Hashimi Rafsancani, and Hosni Mubarak for active support.13 Nevertheless, the 
opposition parties such as the DLP accused the government of being indifferent 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina by stating that not even a single Turkish minister was 
sent to Sarajevo, but, instead high-ranking bureaucrats went to Belgrade.14 
As seen in bilateral economic contacts, during the initial phases of war, the 
positive mutual perceptions between Ankara and Belgrade remained unchanged 
in the economic venue. However, in face of increasing Serbian aggression in 
Bosnia, the two states would now have to re-accommodate these mutual 
perceptions. Subsequently, Ankara played a very active role in the diplomatic 
venue to stop the war instead of employing a status quo rhetoric. However, these 
efforts did not reflect uniformity on the part of the political parties in Turkey. 
Political parties converged on stopping the war, but the question as to how to do 
this brought about discussions in the Parliament, therefore, questioning Ankara’s 
identities and interests. 
Escalating War and Increasing Discord in the Parliament (1993–1994) 
At the outset of war, in April 1992, State Minister Akın Gönen (TPP) announced 
that Turkey officially recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia on 6 February 1992 and relations with these new republics would be 
regulated by the Turkish embassy in Belgrade.15 Mustafa Baş (WP) emphasized 
that just as the country-wide spirit of support during the Turkish – Greek War in 
1919 - 1922, Turkey’s support to Bosnia must display the same intensity and 
vigor. Baş described the government’s attitude as weak after Aliya Izzetbegovic 
was taken into custody.16 He stated that after Izzetbegovic’s arrest, the 
government preferred to question the accuracy of the event itself instead of 
showing an active stance, while Italy, for instance, expressly stated that 
Izzetbegovic must be released immediately. Baş’s speech at the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (hereinafter referred to as “Parliament”) manifested the 
                                                            
12  “Boşnaklardan Ankara’ya ‘şmdat’ Telefonu”, Hürriyet 15 April 1992. 
13  “Özal, Bosna-Hersek şçin ÇaŞrıda Bulundu”, Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1992. 
14  “Bosna-Hersek Katliamı Kınandı”, Cumhuriyet, 27 April 1992. 
15  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 69. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 28 Nisan 1992, Vol. 9, p. 
395-396. 
16  Aliya Izzetbegovic was taken into custody on 2 May 1992 and released within 24 hours. 
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worldview of WP when he stated that they wanted to see the spirit of the 13th 
century Ottoman Sultan Murat and Osman Gazi in the government.17  
A week later, Bosnian Deputy Minister Muhammed Cengic stated at the 
Turkish Parliament that Bosnian officials thought the West would not allow 
ethnic cleansing in the middle of Europe and that the crises in Europe had now 
become a thing of the past. As the weak measures taken by the UN did not 
suffice for even moving physically from one point to another in Sarajevo, the 
Bosnians looked to Turkey for help.18 
On the same day, Adnan Kahveci of MP maintained that the government did 
not take on an active stance but had developed a new sort of diplomacy that he 
labeled “statement diplomacy,” based on nice talk and nothing more. Kahveci 
said that the OSCE was not an effective organization to deter Serbia, and in black 
humor, added that it was possible to describe the acronym as “Allah’ın 
Gariplerinin şç Dökme Klübü” (Poor Men’s Club of Effusion) in Turkish 
(AGşK).19  
The session proceeded with şsmail Cem speaking on behalf of SDPP, 
emphasizing that he spoke on behalf of his group and not the government. Cem 
described the situation in Bosnia as massacre and not “war” and stated that 
Turkey engaged in futile attempts by calling upon international organizations 
such as the OSCE.20 The main problem according to Cem was the failure of aid 
delivery attempts of medicine and food. He proposed that Turkey withdraw its 
ambassador to Serbia just as the EC had done.21 
Speaking on behalf of TPP, Coşkun Kırca touched upon the arms transfer 
issue. Kırca stated that the issue should not even be mentioned either by the 
government or the opposition.22 If and when there was to be arms procurement, 
it would be revealed years later as their transfer and use were confidential issues. 
He said that UN peace forces could only be stationed in Bosnia after a ceasefire. 
As such, Turkey could do something else and that was to get the Western 
organizations to think that the new Serbia did not and could not represent 
former Yugoslavia in legal terms, and convince the West not to recognize Serbia 
as a natural successor of the latter. The second option was to cut off diplomatic 
relations. Third, Turkey should immediately apply to the Security Council. 
                                                            
17  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 72. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 5 May 1992, Vol. 10, 
p.247–248. “Saraybosna’da Ateşkes Kısa Sürdü” Milliyet, 4 May 1992; “şnönü: Bosna’da 
Durum Vahim”, Milliyet, 4 May 1992. 
18  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 75. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 12 May 1992, Vol. 1, 
p.21–22. 
19  Ibid., p. 38. 
20  Ibid., p. 46. 
21  Ibid., p. 47. 
22  Ibid., p. 49.  
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Fourth, Turkey should invite the Security Council to implement the provisions 
of Section 7 of the UN Charter. Fifth, Turkey should invite the Security Council 
to impose economic, trade, transportation, and communication embargo against 
Serbia. Sixth, talks within NATO should begin to discuss possible military 
measures.23 
Following Kırca, Vehbi Dinçerler (MP) stated that Turkey faced a serious 
test especially since FM Çetin held the presidency of Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers, which put additional responsibility upon Turkey with 
respect to taking an active stance.24 Dinçerler maintained that Bosnian Deputy 
PM Cengic had come to Turkey before an official visit on 12 May 1992 and 
called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when Cengic and senior officials had 
lengthy talks with maps open upon which it was decided to send a hundred 
thousand tons of fuel-oil via one point through the sea. It was soon reported that 
at least twenty-five thousand tons had reached Bosnia. This meant that aid could 
reach although the airports and railways had been closed.25  
The succeeding discussion on the war was held on 20 May 1992. FM Çetin 
maintained that efforts were primarily based on forwarding medicine and food 
aid and emphasized that opening and functioning of the airport in Sarajevo must 
be ensured under the supervision of international organizations.26 Following 
Çetin, Mesut Yılmaz (MP) stated that there had been quite a significant 
misunderstanding between MP and the government regarding the issue of 
sending troops to Bosnia. MP never supported any suggestion that included 
Turkey’s unilateral intervention in military terms. It supported all diplomatic 
initiatives in which the government was engaged. More importantly, Yılmaz 
described their point of divergence as follows: if the government took diplomatic 
initiative to halt the armed conflict, that initiative had to have a sufficient degree 
of deterrence to be effective. According to Yılmaz, Turkey had the power of 
deterrence but it did not use it. Yılmaz said that in case the Parliament opens the 
issue of multilateral intervention to discussion, MP would agree to grant 
authority to send troops to Bosnia.27 
In the same session, Bülent Ecevit (DLP) criticized those who maintained 
that the proposals by DLP were based on military solutions. He particularly 
pinpointed Mümtaz Soysal’s (SDPP) comment in which he accused those who 
wanted concrete and effective measures as “little Enver Pashas”. 28 However, 
                                                            
23  Ibid., p. 50-51. 
24  Ibid., p. 54. 
25  Ibid., p. 56. 
26  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 78. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 20 May 1992, Vol. 11, p. 207. 
27  Ibid., p. 208. 
28  Ibid., p. 232. Enver Pasha was a pro-German military officer and the leader of the Young 
Turk revolution who also served as War Minister in the Ottoman State. He had pan-
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Ecevit said that he never suggested that Turkey become a unilateral 
interventionist into the war in Bosnia. He submitted his proposal in two 
headings, the first of which suggested that a force unit similar to Poised Hammer 
must be set up in Bosnia. Second, Turkey should immediately call upon all 
countries of former Yugoslavia to convene in şstanbul and leave the EC out of 
the process.29 
No particular session was held for the discussion of the issue in length after 
20 May 1992. Developments in Bosnia were deliberated only three months later, 
on 25 August 1992. This extraordinary session about Bosnia involved heavy 
criticism of the government.30 In this session, Kamran şnan (MP) warned that 
Albania and Macedonia would be drawn into the conflict which could lead to a 
Third Balkan War. Therefore, the most viable strategy according to şnan was to 
issue an ultimatum to Serbia, giving it twenty four hours for ceasefire. If the 
Serbs refused, the next step would be to carry out an air bombardment. şnan 
observed that this was already echoed in the leading British newspapers such as 
The Observer and London Times and was not a new strategy. In line with the 
arguments of other members of Parliament both from the government and 
opposition, he maintained that Turkey had a moral and historical responsibility 
which should have prompted Ankara to be preponderant in getting the issue 
discussed in the U.S. Congress and the European capitals, which he thought had 
not been accomplished yet.31 
Meanwhile, Serbian Prime Minister Milan Panic visited Turkey and asked 
Ankara not to intervene in the Bosnian conflict. Panic called on the Turkish 
military and proposed to PM Demirel that the Yugoslav Army, under the 
command of Turkish officers, seize all the weapons in Bosnia and demilitarize 
the area, which was not welcomed by Ankara32. şnan protested the official 
reception of the Serbian PM in Ankara. However, more disturbing was a press 
statement which included the following remark: “Turkey and Yugoslavia invite 
all parties fighting in Bosnia to bring an end to war”.33 şnan harshly criticized 
                                                                                                                                                 
Turkist objectives on the basis of which he wanted to unite the Muslim-Turkic peoples of 
Central Asia against Bolshevism, as well as British imperialism in India, which he failed to 
realize when he was killed in Bukhara in 1922. Seemingly, the reference was made to 
Enver Pasha’s interventionist attitude with the aim of drawing attention to the relevant 
similarity on the part of those in the parliament who favored unilateral military 
intervention to Bosnia. 
29  Ibid. 
30  “Ankara, Bosna-Hersek şçin Tek Vücut”, Cumhuriyet, 26 August 1992. 
31  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 94. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 25 August 1992, Vol. 16, p.44. 
32  “Paniç, Türk Subayı şstedi”, Milliyet, 13 August 1992. 
33  TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 94. Birleşim, 19. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 25 August 1992, Vol. 16, p.48. 
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this statement as it implied that aggressor and victim were treated as two legally 
and legitimately warring sides.34  
The harshest criticism against the government came from Necmettin 
Erbakan (WP) who accused both the government and international 
organizations. Erbakan emphasized that the government acted very belatedly in 
convening the Parliament, that is, after Bosnia was almost totally destroyed. He 
saw a causal link between the events in Bosnia and what he called the influence 
of “certain Zionist and other” elements who infused in their societies the idea 
that Muslims had to be wiped out from Europe.35 Erbakan was struck by the fact 
that the government dismissed arguments suggesting a polarization between 
Islam and Christianity while, for instance, Velibor Estovic, Yugoslav Information 
Minister, openly said they had inherited and undertaken the mission of the 
Crusaders.36  
The OIC foreign ministers had convened in şstanbul in June 1992 at the end 
of which the international community was called upon to intervene militarily. 
Furthermore, Turkey allocated a cargo aircraft by which $ 1.7 million aid was 
sent to Bosnia. In reply to Erbakan’s arguments, şnönü said that a total of sixteen 
deliveries were received in Bosnia. The Red Crescent procured $ 240,000 in aid 
including food and medicine which was delivered in November 1991. Three tons 
of medicine and other medical equipment were sent by Turkish Airlines in May 
1992. Turkish cargo aircraft carried similar aid of ten tons to Zagreb, Croatia. 
şnönü refuted the allegations by the opposition as Turkey provided 
accommodation for more than 15,000 refugees. A Turkish vessel participated in 
the marine force stationed in the Adriatic for the supervision of embargo on 
Serbia.37 şnönü reminded participants that Turkey had submitted the Action Plan 
for Bosnia to the ambassadors of UN Security Council to Ankara in early August 
1992. As such, Turkey was the only state to prepare and submit such a plan by 
then.38 Yet, Ecevit argued that Turkey did not have a well-defined Balkan 
policy.39  
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Eventually, this extraordinary session produced the following parameters: 1) 
The Parliament does not and shall not accept any forced change in the territorial 
integrity and the boundaries of Bosnia, 2) The Parliament is in solidarity with 
the Bosnian Muslims subjected to one of the most severe massacres in history 
and is prepared to extend aid, 3) The Parliament deems international use of force 
necessary to end Serbian attacks as a humanitarian and peace-bound duty and 
expects the same from the international community, and 4) Should the 
international use of force be exercised belatedly, the Parliament shall see it as a 
humanitarian duty to take every effort to bring an end to Serbian attacks.40 
On 24 August, the UN General Assembly was convened upon Ankara’s 
initiative and accepted a resolution condemning the acquisition of territory by 
force in Bosnia which was interpreted as a notable success for Turkey. However, 
it was easier for the General Assembly to take such bold decisions as a body that 
did not have any effective sanctioning power.41 On 27–28 August 1992, an EC 
conference was held in London, attended by approximately 500 diplomats. After 
the conference, talk of military intervention was shelved, and the leaders issued a 
96-hour ultimatum to Serbia.42 As such, the conference was no more than a 
combination of stillborn efforts. 
In autumn 1992, Ankara decided to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on 
trying to get the UN arms embargo revoked in the case of Bosnian government. 
Turkey formulated a threefold demand: lifting of the arms embargo, 
establishment of safe havens, and limited military intervention.43 When the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 781, banning all military flights in Bosnian 
air space, excluding UNPROFOR and other flights supporting UN operations 
through October 1992, Turkey began to press for its implementation. After the 
adoption of this Resolution, the Vance–Owen Plan was proposed to the Serbs, 
Croats and Bosnians in Geneva in October 1992. Following Izzetbegovic’s visit to 
Ankara in August 1992, Cyrus Vance (former US Secretary of State and UN 
Special Envoy to Bosnia) and David Owen (EC representative, appointed Co-
                                                                                                                                                 
“Türkiye’den BM’ye Harekat Planı”, Hürriyet; 8 August 1992; “Ankara, Bosna’ya Şafak 
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41  Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives”, p.305. 
42  Faruk Zabcı, “Batı’dan Bosna’ya Hayır Yok”, Hürriyet, 28 August 1992.  
43  Philip Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy”, http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/-publications 
/mfa3.html, (Accessed on 12 January 2006). 
ULUSLARARASIiLiŞKiLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS 
48 
Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia) paid an official visit to Turkey. In November 1992, Turkey 
criticized the Vance–Owen Plan for having created ethnically pure zones which 
punished the victim and rewarded the aggressor.44  
Through the end of 1992, rather than appealing to the international 
community to take on full action over Bosnia, Turkey’s efforts seemed to be 
focused on specific diplomatic objectives. When foreign ministers of the Balkan 
states convened in şstanbul in November 1992, the final declaration of this 
meeting centered on the aid issue. The draft resolution proposed by Turkey and 
U.S.A. at the UN Human Rights Commission on 30 November–1 December 1992 
was adopted. The resolution defined the Serbs as aggressor and the Muslims in 
Bosnia as victim while confirming that the main actors of the cleansing campaign 
were the Serbian leadership in Bosnia, Yugoslav Federal Army and leadership of 
the Republic of Serbia.45 
In December 1992, the Parliament voted that the government be given full 
authority to contribute to UNPROFOR according to Resolution 743 and for 
deployment of troops in foreign countries. Subsequently, the UN Security 
Council decided to intervene in Somalia which prompted the government to 
raise the issue of troop deployment on foreign territories. The Parliament 
approved both authorizations and the international force in Somalia was later 
headed by a Turkish General, Çevik Bir.46 Two days later, Turkey’s Chief of the 
General Staff repeated in its Bosnia Report that unilateral intervention was 
impossible. The main reason was the inability of fuel transfer in air; the F-16s 
could fly only for a limited time.47 Eventually, the UN General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 47/121 which was proposed jointly by Bosnia and Turkey. Since the 
resolution condemned ethnic cleansing and stated that Bosnia had the right to 
self-defense, it asked the Security Council to decide on military intervention 
unless Serbian militia attacks stopped by 15 January 1993. This was the closest 
UN resolution to the Turkish position.48 
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In the framework of new efforts, the Turkish delegation comprising State 
Minister Orhan KilercioŞlu (TPP), şsmail Amasyalı (TPP, an MP who spoke 
Bosnian), medical staff, and correspondents of the TRT, Anatolian Agency, and 
other journalists went to Zagreb in January 1993. The delegation contacted the 
Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakkı Turajlič, among other officials, who 
requested aid delivery to 270,000 people who were confined in six regions, 
deprived of aid for nine months.49 Due to heavy fire, KilercioŞlu had to hold the 
meeting with Turajlič at the airport. After the one-hour meeting, while 
KilercioŞlu flew back, Turajlič was assassinated by fire from two Serb tanks, in 
the presence of a UN convoy. President Özal argued that the assassination clearly 
showed the extent to which mediation efforts were undermined by the Serbs.50  
In January 1993, Atilla Mutman (SDPP) underlined that although it had the 
resolve, Turkey would not unilaterally engage in an intervention. First, any 
attack outside the UN framework would not be legitimate. Second, Turkey 
would have to ask Bulgaria for flight permission and call off the blockade in the 
Adriatic Sea, and neither proposal would curry favor.51 Turkey eventually joined 
the NATO operation in 1993 in accordance with the UN Resolution 816 for 
enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. A squadron of eighteen F-16s joined 
the operation.52 This was followed by fervent demands of the opposition with 
respect to the proposal of holding a general session on the Bosnian issue on 13 
April 1993.53  
Amidst these efforts, it was alleged that Turkey received imports valued at 
approximately $7 million from Serbia. In a written question, the government was 
asked if this was true, and if so, what were the goods that Turkey “had to” 
import from Serbia. It was emphasized that sustaining trade relations with the 
Serbs while requesting harsh measures against Belgrade was but hypocrisy. In 
reply, Çetin stated in writing that there was no record of such trade. The issue 
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was also forwarded to the Under Secretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade. The 
answer by both state agencies confirmed that there had been no record of 
imports from Serbia between June 1992, the date of government’s ban on trade, 
until August 1993, the last date of available recorded data.54  
In February 1994, NATO gave an ultimatum telling the Serbs to pull back 
all the heavy artillery. NATO announced that if the Serbs did not comply with 
the ultimatum, it would bomb the Serb targets. This was welcomed by Turkey. 
The following day, news headlines read that the newly elected U.S. President 
William Clinton gave clear signals to Serbs, Greece and Russia in three ways: 1) 
NATO now openly confronted the Serbs, 2) it announced recognition of 
Macedonia after the last NATO Summit and 3) the decision to intervene implied 
that the U.S.A. was the only superpower. Indeed, it was soon stated by PM Tansu 
Çiller that the NATO plan had already been proposed to the UN Security 
Council by Turkey in August 1992 and it was in essence the Turkish thesis.55  
By March 1994, UN approved the deployment of Turkish troops in Bosnia.56 
Following this, the Bosnians and Croats signed a peace treaty in Washington to 
establish a federation.57 Upon increasing Turkish efforts, the UN decided 
unanimously to send Turkish troops to Bosnia despite Greek opposition. 
President Demirel openly expressed that Turkish troops did not go to Bosnia to 
revive the Ottoman Empire but to help bring peace.58 It is not clear where the 
concept of “neo-Ottomanism” came from, but it was a frequent rejoinder in the 
European media about Turkish foreign policy activism. 
Ten different times, Turkey brought together and hosted the Muslims and 
Croats. Upon the initiatives of Ankara, the basis of trilateral cooperation between 
the Bosnian Prime Minister Sladzic and Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Granic 
was established, followed by the Washington Agreement. Çetin emphasized that 
it was not fair to criticize the government when the Turkish position regarding 
the war had reached such a desired level despite Greek opposition at 
international platforms.59 Çetin’s remarks regarding the “desired level” implied 
sending troops to Bosnia, in a multilateral forum espoused by Ankara. 
Eventually, the first and second group of Turkish troops went to Bosnia on 
15 and 25 June 1994, respectively60 and arrived in Zenica in July 1994 to 
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participate in the UNPROFOR. A week later, President Demirel’s visit to Sarajevo 
was cancelled due to serious Serb threat.61 In November 1994, while the war 
intensified, Vehbi Dinçerler put forward a list of proposals. First and foremost, 
he proposed that sub-commissions be set up in the Parliament for close follow-
up of developments. Second, a research commission should be established, 
which would undertake on-site research temporarily as almost all of the 
representatives of NATO member states did in Bihac. Third, a joint action 
commission should be formed to coordinate steps to be taken by the 
government, military, and the executive. Finally, Dinçerler suggested that a 
delegation should be formed to facilitate the follow-up and coordination of state 
efforts to be directed by the President himself. These proposals were received 
positively by the speaker of Parliament.62 
In sum, on the one hand the decision makers made efforts to get a clear view 
of what was taking place with the end of the bipolar structure at the 
international level and regimes changes at the regional level, on the other hand 
they tried to formulate policies towards the war in this tumult. Political parties 
mostly converged on the impossibility of unilateral intervention, advocated 
multilateral intervention in the UN framework, and appealed also to Islamic 
countries to act. In the final analysis, in this period, Ankara made efforts as 
much as its power, capacity and abilities allowed.63 
Through the Final Act (1995) 
The Bosnia Inquiry Commission was set up through December 1994 and 
conducted investigations in Turkey, Croatia, and Bosnia, as the first field search 
to provide support to the Turkish PM. The research visit took place in February 
1995. The fact that a Bosnia inquiry commission was set up within the 
Parliament was welcomed by Bosnian officials during the Commission’s visit in 
Bosnia, carried out in three phases. The first stop was Croatia where the 
Commission had official contacts with the Speaker of the Croatian Assembly, 
Speaker of the Federal Assembly, Prime Minister, leaders of the Muslim 
community, and Ambassador Yasushi Akashi of the UN.64  
The Turkish delegation expressed its concerns regarding the safe delivery of 
aid to Bosnia through Croatia and this was positively received by Croatia. 
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Turkish officials and Izzetbegovic agreed that there was no peace in Bosnia but 
just a ceasefire, not adhered to by the Serbs. It was the common diagnosis of 
Izzetbegovic and the Turkish military corps in Bosnia that fighting would begin 
again very soon.65  
When the Bosnian Foreign Minister, şrfan Lubjankic was killed, the failure 
of the UN was seen once again in May 1995. Regarding the event, Abdullah Gül 
(WP) stated in June 1995 that Turkey did not make all the efforts that it could 
have and that as news reports had reflected, considering future relations, it 
instead gave positive messages to Serbia when it should be acting as Bosnia’s 
“representative”.66 Almost simultaneously, NATO and UN defense ministers and 
chiefs of staff convened in Paris to discuss an urgent intervention force of 4,000 
soldiers and Defense Minister Mehmet Gölhan (TPP) said Turkey would also 
participate with F-16s in this multinational urgent intervention force”.67 
Subsequently, Serbian attacks on the Turkish division in Zenica and the embassy 
in Sarajevo coincided with Turkey’s declaration.68 From then on, the UN became 
one of the Serb targets which began to take UN soldiers hostage. The UN could 
not protect its own soldiers anymore and rumors spread that it would pull back. 
However, right after the UN headquarters in Sarajevo was hit by the Serbs, 
injuring Colonel Mahmut Ergün and a French captain,69 Turkey announced that 
it would not pull back.70 Turkey and Bosnia signed an agreement of military 
cooperation on 10 August 1995.71 
The belated NATO intervention began through the end of August 
eventually, joined by sixty war planes including Turkish F-16s. A total of ninety 
targets of ammunition depots, command centers and defense systems were hit 
with approximately 300 sorties.72 Shortly, diplomatic traffic in Ankara 
accelerated. Izzetbegovic came to Ankara on 4 September and met U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. During the visit, Holbrooke stated that any 
peace operation would necessitate Turkey’s participation. It was also reported 
that the U.S.A. wanted Turkey to use its influence upon the Bosnian Muslims in 
future peace talks.73 
On 8 September, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia 
reached a compromise in Geneva. Bosnia was divided into “Croat–Muslim 
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Federation” and “Respublica Srpska” which meant that the Serbs officially 
recognized Bosnia. Serbs began to pull back in September upon which NATO 
ended its air strikes.74 Accordingly, the fighting parties convened in New York in 
late September for peace negotiations. The final document of the negotiation 
came into being as the Dayton Peace Accord and constituted the final settlement 
of three-years of fighting. How this episode fits into constructivist interpretation 
follows. 
A Constructivist Interpretation of Policy Formulations during the War 
First and foremost, it should be noted that this study discerned the Parliament, 
which includes the government and the opposition parties, as the “State” within 
boundaries of its scope, still mindful of the other actors75 which constitute the 
Turkish “State” in terms of foreign policy making. In the case of the war in 
Bosnia, the Turkish “State” was the main actor influencing foreign policy making 
and could use its capacity in accordance with the material forces. And yet, the 
latter were not the sole determinant in the foreign policy making process; 
intersubjectivities and identities were also effective as the parliamentary debates 
of the political parties lay bare.  
Second and related with the first, moving from the premise that 
international structures are intersubjective and not driven solely by material 
factors, constructivism holds that they are socially constructed by cognitive 
structures that assign meaning to the material world. In this respect, Turkey’s 
active foreign policy making towards Bosnia explains to what extent the political 
parties’ perceptions towards Bosnia, socially constructed by cognitive structures 
embedded in Turkish state through its Balkan heritage and cultural identity, 
converged on stopping the war and advocated a multilateral intervention in the 
UN framework. Viewed in retrospect, the shared knowledge due to its Balkan 
heritage, the common denominator of culture, the existence of people of Bosnian 
origin in Turkey all spoke for themselves. The welcoming attitude towards 
Bosnian officials at the Parliament during the war, as opposed to that towards 
Serbian officials also affirms the existence of a positively perceived 
intersubjectivity towards Bosnia on the part of Turkish political actors. However, 
Turkish foreign policy makers still employed caution and self-restraint in their 
policy calculations in order not to be viewed as trying to revive neo-
Ottomanism.76 In contrast, occasional visits by their Serbian counterparts would 
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trigger rather negative responses among the political parties, which also denoted 
a change for the worse in intersubjectivities after the break of war towards 
Serbian political actors. It can safely be maintained that the case was not 
different in respect of Turkish officials who had contacts with relevant 
counterparts abroad. As the minutes display, all political parties’ discourses seem 
to point out a positively perceived intersubjectivity vis-à-vis Bosnia. 
Third, constructivist theorizing maintains that as opposed to neorealism, 
states’ identities and interests are not given exogenously, but constructed in time 
and space. Since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey’s identity is 
known to be western-oriented, which was also observed in its attitude towards 
the war in Bosnia. Although this was questioned and harshly criticized on 
occasion by the religious and nationalist parties in the Parliament at the time, 
Ankara never deviated from this established path. It acted along with the western 
line, especially in the initial phases of the war by temporarily arguing for the 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, for instance. Likewise, when the West 
recognized the breakaway republics, Ankara followed suit. While it appealed to 
the Islamic countries as part of its efforts, it never substituted this with its efforts 
to attract the attention of the West.  
It should also be recalled that as opposed to the pro-status quo tradition in 
foreign policy making adopted thus far, Turkey had embarked on an era of active 
foreign policy introduced by Özal starting with the policy pursued during the 
first Gulf War. It was articulated more concretely in PM Mesut Yılmaz’s 
government program in July 1991, which stated that Turkish foreign policy 
would take on an active path thereafter.77  
In the face of developments in the Balkans and elsewhere, Turkey had 
already begun to restructure its foreign policy from being “the tail end of Europe 
into the center of its own newly emerging world” in Fuller’s description of the 
state of affairs.78 According to Fuller, this was an abandonment of Turkey’s 
traditional policy of non-involvement in regional conflicts in the new post-Cold 
War openings.79 This entailed that the main thrust of Turkey’s response to the 
new post-Cold War situation was to pursue a more active role in the regions 
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surrounding its borders – the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Middle East.80 As the mastermind of this strategy, Özal played a central role both 
in its formulation and implementation. At the core of this approach was the 
belief that Turkey could continue to be an important ally of the West only by 
expanding its regional role and influence.81 As the minutes reveal, the 
pronounced activism on the part of Turkey through the end of the 20th century, 
as well as Özal and Demirel’s personal efforts as part of this approach, is evident 
in the Bosnian case. Accordingly, this called into consideration the following: to 
take into account its Balkan heritage, to stand against aggression, to keep the 
Balkan land/air routes open as they were the major access routes to Europe in 
terms of trade. It also had to do with the objective of not severing diplomatic 
relations with Serbia throughout the whole ordeal, although the two states had 
their differences. Thus, although western-oriented attitude was at work in 
Turkey’s foreign policy identity throughout the war, the non-interventionist 
attitude observed so far towards immediate sub-regions - in the same identity – 
pointed out a change towards a revitalized activism in Turkish foreign policy 
making.  
Fourth, in view of the constructivist proposition that agents interpret a 
certain reality will shape their views of responsibility, the war in Bosnia 
manifests that all political parties had their own views concerning the issue 
which shaped their attitudes concerning responsibility, i.e, whether to 
participate in a possible intervention or not. The coalition government of TPP–
SDPP repeatedly announced that Turkey could send troops to the UNPROFOR, 
even before the skirmishes turned into full-scale fighting and engaged in serious 
political and diplomatic efforts in international platforms but never supported 
the idea of unilateral intervention. Occasionally, the government described the 
reality in Bosnia as outright massacre and not “war”, but still refrained from the 
rhetoric of a religious conflict and labeled it a humanitarian one. This was 
observed, for instance, in the government’s appeal to both Western and Islamic 
organizations regarding the issue. Although being a coalition government of one 
leftist and one rightist party, the government’s reading of the reality in Bosnia 
did not indicate any essential divide in itself, which impacted on the formulation 
of a balanced and cautious foreign policy that saw intervention necessary not on 
the basis of religious identity but a humanitarian responsibility. 
On the other hand, MP mostly criticized the appeals made by the 
government to international organizations by arguing they were futile and held 
that Turkey could do more in diplomatic terms. Like the government, MP was 
also against unilateral intervention, yet if the matter was brought for discussion, 
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MP stated they would agree to grant authority to send troops to Bosnia. As a 
party with a center-right identity, MP’s position regarding the war resembled that 
of TPP –except that they considered government’s efforts insufficient- and 
despite being an opposition party, it was quite active with respect to Bosnia, 
which was in line with the new direction introduced by their previous leader 
Özal in foreign policy making. However, whether this behavior was opposition 
for the sake of opposition was a different matter. 
As a leftist opposition party, DLP also never supported a unilateral 
intervention in Bosnia, but accused the government of not having a well-defined 
Balkan policy. However, unlike the other leftist political actors’ rhetoric on the 
war, Ecevit once remarked that the war had turned into a Crusade against 
Muslims.  
As a party with more pronounced religious motives, WP, for its part, argued 
that this war was a religious war per se, a result of an idea infused in the Western 
societies which argued Muslims had to be wiped out from Europe, and harshly 
criticized the government’s dismissal of arguments suggesting a polarization 
between religions. It also accused the government of not acting as Bosnia’s 
representative in international platforms and of pursuing a policy of equidistance 
towards all former Yugoslav republics. 
However, it should be emphasized that while arguing for intervention, 
political parties were also concerned with possible risks which could face 
Turkish troops as well as small prospect of success. As if to confirm Jackson’s 
remark that “it is becoming that a world in which statesmen have international 
and humanitarian responsibilities as well as national responsibilities” and 
“[p]olitical virtue in such circumstances involves the willingness not only to 
recognize that these diverging responsibilities exist but also to make decisions in 
which due regard is paid to all of them”,82 political parties were ahead of their 
western counterparts at the time when calling for a possible multilateral 
intervention, which showed that they were cognizant of its implications. 
In light of the above, it is argued that the identities of the parties and how 
they viewed reality in Bosnia shaped their relevant responsibility considerations 
supportive of urgent multilateral intervention –except for WP which 
occasionally repeated its support for unilateral intervention and cutting off ties 
with the West. Despite the long war and rather rapid changes of governments 
due to instability in Turkey’s domestic politics during those years, the 
Parliament, as the most populous of the foreign policy actors in Turkey, could 
converge on vital matters and how to act accordingly.  
                                                            
82  Robert H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society”, Ken Booth and Steve Smith 
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge, MPG Books Ltd, 2002, p. 123.  
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Concluding Remarks 
This study sought to examine the debates in the Turkish Parliament during the 
war in Bosnia by construing Ankara’s relevant foreign policies between 1992 and 
1995 through key tenets of constructivism. It has argued that although the 
incumbent governments were coalition governments formed by the 
representatives of two opposite mainstream political trends in Turkey, Ankara’s 
foreign policy towards Bosnia, even during the most challenging of times of the 
war, was ahead of those of the west, particularly in respect of calling for urgent 
multilateral intervention, active diplomacy and, more importantly, in respect of 
their distinction of who the aggressor and the victim were right from the 
beginning of the war.  
While Ankara took into account its Balkan heritage and stance against 
aggression as the main pillars in policy formulations, it also tried not to sever 
relations with Serbia, cognizant of the significance of Balkan land/air routes since 
they were the main access routes of trade for Turkey. The detailed empirical data 
of the study revealed how the foreign policy pillars subsequently came into 
existence and demonstrated under what conditions the state as a key actor, 
intersubjectivities and identity, responsibilities were at work in the foreign policy 
making process. The intersubjectivities between the Turkish state (in our case 
the Parliament), and the parties to the conflict had their impact on the 
characterization of the war by the Turkish political parties, which defined their 
positions: not just observing, but participating and calling upon the international 
community to follow suit. As Turkey’s identity underwent changes with the end 
of the Cold War, Ankara acted both in line with the traditional western-oriented 
way of acting in foreign policy making and also pursued an active foreign policy 
introduced by Özal, which was committed to follow a more active foreign policy 
in its vicinity, including the Balkans. In doing so, however, it was particularly 
careful not to be regarded as trying to revive neo-Ottomanism. Activism in 
foreign policy was paramount for all countries in the aftermath of the Soviet 
dissolution. Turkey’s revitalized activism was not an exception, but it was for its 
renewed interest in its immediate, historical neighbors. On the other hand, the 
way the political parties interpreted the reality in Bosnia paved the way for 
frequent pronunciation of multilateral intervention: right from the beginning, 
there was talk of “how to intervene”, and not “whether or not to intervene” at 
the Parliament (unlike the case in the West), which suffices to argue for an 
existence of a shared conceptualization of responsibility among the parties. 
Thinking in retrospect, although the Balkans were not viewed as a hard security 
area for Turkey, Ankara engaged in vigorous efforts to devise a formula to halt 
the conflict in Bosnia, which came into existence as the Action Plan as early as in 
August 1992, to give one example.  
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It remains to be said that the view of the war in Bosnia, was one test for 
Turkish political parties’ responses, through the kernels of constructivism, and 
detailed empirical data is a tenable one for obtaining a broader comprehension of 
how diversities were brought to pass eventually in the form of consensus. 
However, given that the war came at a quite confusing and chaotic time to study 
international politics, it is left open whether or not another conceptual 
framework, or others, can provide a better means in elucidating the subject of 
enquiry. Perhaps the underlying question here would not be whether or not one 
- or more – lens(es) provide(s) the answer, but whether the accounts of the war 
in Bosnia would be those of the same world or different worlds in the 
perceptions of its narrators.83 In the final analysis, it is my conviction that this 
study was one attempt to evaluate both the empirical state of affairs at the time 
and the theoretical implications upon which they subsequently had impacted, for 
the purpose of canvassing our own mind about what was uppermost in the 
Turkish political parties’ perceptions of the ‘world’ in Bosnia at the time and, 
hopefully, provoking rethinking on the subject.  
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International Relations Theory”, Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today, Cambridge, MPG Books Ltd, 2002, p. 30 – 32. 
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